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Abstract
Family ﬁ rms are a widespread control structure in most countries, especially among 
smaller ﬁ rms. A vast literature addresses the question of whether they are performing 
better or worse than comparable non family ﬁ rms, with not entirely conclusive results. 
Here we take a different, indirect approach and test whether investment decisions in 
family ﬁ rms are more sensitive to uncertainty than in other ﬁ rms. By using a novel dataset 
that includes both a better deﬁ nition of family ﬁ rms than commonly used (through self 
evaluation) and a very good proxy of the uncertainty on future demand that ﬁ rms face, 
we are able to verify that – as compared to other ﬁ rms – family ﬁ rms are signiﬁ cantly 
more sensitive to uncertainty: this might contribute to explain why in some situations 
they perform better, whereas in others they do worse. We ﬁ nd evidence that this greater 
sensitivity to uncertainty in family ﬁ rms is basically due to the effects of risk aversion 
and capital irreversibility, where the latter appear to be associated to a greater opaqueness 
of family ﬁ rms rather than to the degree of sunkness of ﬁ xed capital. Finally, we propose 
some evidence that the prevalence of family ﬁ rms in Italy might be associated to long 
standing institutional factors, such as an inefﬁ cient law enforcement system and a low 
social capital.  
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1. Introduction1
 
 
A vast literature studies the behavior and performance of (mainly listed) family firms, 
trying to assess whether they are better or worse performers than other firms, under a number 
of respects. Although not entirely conclusive, these contributions show that family firms might 
be more profitable (or show higher market valuation) only under certain conditions, i.e. when 
they are managed by the founder. 
In this paper we concentrate on one aspect that has been only recently explicitly 
analyzed and which might shed some light on the “dynamics” of family firms behavior, i.e. their 
investment decision process and more specifically their reaction to uncertainty. Our hypothesis 
is that family firms are on average more risk averse than other firms, because of, for example, a 
higher share of the owner’s wealth invested in the firm. In this case, their investments should 
be more negatively correlated with uncertainty. 
The question is particularly relevant in Italy, a country characterised by a subdued 
growth over the last 10 years, as compared both to the past and to international competitors. 
One of the proposed explanations is that the concentrated control structure prevailing in Italy 
has limited the necessary ownership transfers and the investments needed for the restructuring 
of some sectors and companies. One of the reasons might be the widespread family ownership 
structure: if family firms are more risk averse and because of this more reactive to uncertainty, 
this might explain their insufficient reaction with respect to restructuring needs in a changing 
environment. It remains to be evaluated whether the higher reactivity to uncertainty of family 
firms allows a better evaluation of risk in a longer term perspective. 
Our analysis might also help in explaining different results on family firms performance. 
Family firms might be an optimal governance structure in certain contexts or periods but 
inefficient in others. Morck and Yeung (2009) suggest that concentrated structures might be 
better (or even necessary) in periods of recovery (when stability is needed and risk taking is not 
a good strategy) but not when major innovations (e.g. the IT revolution) have to be exploited.  
 The paper is articulated as follows: after a brief survey of the literature on family firms 
(par. 2), we present our methodology to analyze firms’ investment strategies (par. 3). Our main 
                                                 
1  We are grateful to Luigi Guiso and participants in the Conference “Tendenze nel sistema produttivo italiano” 
(Banca d'Italia, 27-28 November 2008) and in the Conference “Productivity, Industry and Growth: a Comparative 
Perspective” (Milan, Università Cattolica, 12 June 2009) for their comments. The usual caveats apply. Financial support 
from PRIN is gratefully acknowledged (R. Golinelli). The views contained here are those of the authors and do not 
necessarily reflect those of the institutions for which they work. 
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results are discussed in par. 4, while the following one qualifies them and tests their robustness. 
Par. 6 offers some evidence on the underlying reasons for the diffusion of family firms in Italy. 
Par. 7 concludes. 
 
2.  Family firms and performance 
 One of the fundamental issues in the literature on the performance of family firms 
concerns their definition: Miller et al. (2007) show how many different definitions for family 
firms have been used in the literature, ranging from “organizations controlled and usually managed by 
multiple family members, often from multiple generations” to “founding family or founding individual”. Given 
the difficulty of identifying precisely whether the company is run by a family, often a threshold 
of ownership is used (i.e., when the largest owner is an individual and has a share larger than 
some threshold, it is assumed to be a family run business). In most cases the analyses are 
referred to listed companies. 
In the literature there is convergence on the conclusion that family firms appear 
extremely common in most countries2
Results on family firms performance are not homogenous. Claessens et al. (2002) for 
Southeast Asian countries, Morck et al. (2000) for Canada, Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) for 
Sweden find that family firms are characterized by a worse performance. Bertrand and Schoar 
(2006) show that stronger family ties (as measured in the World Values Survey) are associated 
with a larger fraction of total market value controlled by families, but also with lower levels of 
per capita GDP, fewer publicly traded firms and a smaller average size of firms. Family firms 
also seem to be associated with weaker managerial practices (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007 and 
Bandiera et al., 2008, for the Italian case). 
, including the US (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). In 
Europe, Barontini and Caprio (2006) find that 53% of their sample of listed companies (which 
excludes the UK) is controlled by a family, with Finland and the Netherlands having the lowest 
percentages (the Netherlands approximately 35%) and Italy and Belgium the highest (Italy more 
than 75%). Franks et al. (2009) provide evidence of a convergence of governance structures 
across European countries (with the notable exception of Italy): in Germany and France they 
observe a trend towards a more dispersed ownership (and hence towards a reduced importance 
of family firms) across the 1000 largest firms.  
                                                 
2  See e. g., Bertrand and Schoar (2006), Barontini and Caprio (2006). 
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On the other hand, Khanna and Palepu (2000) for India, Sraer and Thesmar (2007) for 
France, Barontini and Caprio (2006) for continental Europe and Favero et al. (2006) for Italy 
find a better performance for family firms. In particular, Barontini and Caprio show that (listed) 
family firms tend to use more than other firms control-enhancing mechanisms, but controlling 
for their adoption (which is found to be wealth reducing) show that family firms outperform 
the others. 
A number of (more recent) analyses have concentrated on a specific period in the life of 
family firms, i.e. the transfer of ownership to heirs3. In general, the evidence converges in 
finding that a better performance of family firms is associated to the founder, whereas heirs’ 
controlled firms typically show a worse performance4
More related to our analysis, Cucculelli (2008) examines the responsiveness of company 
sales to changes in market demand for different ownership structures in European firms 
(approximately 8.000 firms over the period 1995-2004). He finds that family firms – even if 
they outperform other types of ownership in terms of profitability measures - show a lower 
than average growth rate and that their sensitivity to industry shocks is lower than other types 
of firms. He concludes that family firms are less able to seize market opportunities than firms 
with industrial and financial company ownership. Schmid et al. (2008) show that, in a sample of 
German listed firms, family ones are less diversified into unrelated business segments, but not 
in related segments. Finally, Barba Navaretti et al. (2008) show that Italian family firms export 
less than others:  according to the authors, this might be due to their higher risk aversion.  
. 
 
3. Empirical strategy 
In what follows we concentrate on the investment decisions of firms: we believe that by 
considering firms’ dynamic behavior we might indirectly shed some light on their results in 
terms of performance.  
More specifically we want to analyze whether family firms’ investment behavior is more 
sensitive to uncertainty as compared to non family firms. As typically the entrepreneur has a 
large share of wealth invested in the family firm, we expect that her risk aversion is higher than 
in cases of dispersed ownership or other control structures. Under this respect, our analysis is 
                                                 
3  See Ellul et al (2009),Cucculelli and Micucci (2008). 
4  See Villalonga and Amit (2006), Morck et al., (2000); Bennedsen et al. (2007), Adams et al (2008), Perez-Gonales 
(2006). 
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complementary to that of Michelacci and Schivardi (2008) and of Barba Navaretti et al. (2008), 
who offer some evidence of the negative reactions of family firms to idiosyncratic risk. 
Compared to the available literature on family firms, we consider firm investment 
behavior and not their performance (but see, with a slightly different perspective, Andres 
(2008), who considers the sensitivity of firms’ investment to cash flow availability. Secondly, we 
use a sample of unlisted Italian companies, whereas most of the analyses refer to listed 
companies; we believe it is extremely relevant to shed some light on the behavior of these 
companies which account for a large share of production (value added) in most countries. 
Finally, our definition of family firm is based on self-assessment (see below for the details) and 
not derived from the comparison between ownership shares and a threshold, inevitably 
affected by some degree of arbitrariness. We believe this ensures a much more precise 
identification of family firms and their decisions. 
 
3.1 Datasets and variables  
Our dataset is the result of three main sources: the Survey on Investment in 
Manufacturing (SIM), the Company Accounts Data Service (CADS), and the breakdown by 
sector of the National Account data (NA).  
The SIM is a survey conducted annually by the Bank of Italy on a sample of – 
approximately 3000 – Italian firms (belonging to the industrial and service sectors), providing 
unique information on firms’ investment plans, their expected demand, the range between its 
minimum and maximum expected growth rate for the following year (henceforth, the min-max 
range), the existence of credit constraints, some characteristics of firm governance. By 
considering the whole sample of firms in the period 1996-2007, which we use as our sample 
period because all (or most) variables are available for these years, the total number of 
observations is 32,925 (company-year cases), of which 26,040 belong to the manufacturing 
sector. Excluding the manufacturing firms with less than 50 employees, for which the 
information on uncertainty is not available, and the no response cases, the sample shrinks to 
12,130 observations5
To compute a proxy for “uncertainty” we use the min-max range of the expected 
growth rate of demand. Specifically, if 
. 
1itt g +  is the expected growth rate of the ith company’s 
demand between t and t+1 at constant prices and SALit the value at current prices of the ith 
                                                 
5  See Banca d’Italia (2008). 
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company’s sales in t (both variables taken from SIM), then expected level of sales (at constant 
prices) in t+1 is ( ) it1itt1itt YgY ++ += 1 , where 
it
it
it PY
SAL
Y =  and itPY is the individual sales’ 
deflator6 ( )1itt gu +. We define uncertainty about the future demand growth rate, , as the min-
max range of the expected growth rate at constant prices reported by the SIM respondents7
( ) ( ) ( ) itmin1ittmax1ittit1itt1itt YggYguYu ++++ −==
, 
. This measure  may actually be taken as a 
simplified version of that proposed in Guiso and Parigi (1999)8
From the SIM dataset we also obtain a set of variables describing the firm’s governance 
structure. Since 2006 the survey includes a question on whether the firm identifies itself as a 
“family” or “non family” firm (the first being described as a firm that is directly or indirectly 
controlled by an individual or a group of individuals linked by family relationships). We believe 
this is a better definition than most of those used in the literature, which rely on proxies based 
on the characteristics of the direct owners of the company (only in some cases on the ultimate 
owners) and which might give a distorted representation. For example, in our sample 
approximately 70 per cent of firms define themselves as family controlled, whereas if we 
considered as family firms those where the largest shareholder is an individual we would have 
44 per cent of the firms; if we further required that the individual owns at least 20 per cent of 
the shares we would only have 39% of the companies. 
. 
Prior to 2006, firms  are classified as family or non family by exploiting a specific 
question contained in the 2007 survey: whether the firm did not change control since its 
foundation and in case it did, whether before the change it was a family or non family firm. We 
complemented this information with others on: direct ownership (since it might matter for our 
analysis whether the family firm belongs to a group structure - hence its direct owner is not an 
                                                 
6  Individual sales’ deflators are obtained by applying the SIM growth rate for year t to the previous year NA deflator 
level of the sector to which the firm belongs. We use NA sector deflator levels when SIM growth rates are not available.  
7  In the 2005 survey the min max range was substituted for by a more complex question on the firms’ whole 
probability distribution of the expected growth rate of demand (as in the 1993 survey used by Guiso and Parigi, 1999). In 
order to obtain comparable observations for year 2005, we have computed a min-max version for 2005 by assuming that the 
min-max range corresponds to the width of a 90% normal confidence interval around the average expected growth of future 
demand. This hypothesis has been validated by regressing (without intercept) the available min-max ranges of 2004 and 
2006 against the 2005 standard deviation. The estimates - 3.12 and 3.37 respectively - corroborate the amplitude of a 90% 
interval centered around the mean which, for a normal distribution, would be equal to 2×1.65=3.3; R2 coefficients are both 
larger than 40%, suggesting a good explanatory power of the hypothesis.  
8  Since not all firms with more than 49 employees report the min-max range, we run a probit regression of non-
response probability against time dummies and a set of observable characteristics, such as industry, location, type of 
ownership, size, and share of exported production. The only significant effect concerns public and large firms, which are 
less likely to report the min-max range, hopefully because the respondents are not close enough to the top management to 
provide a suitable answer. Therefore, the loss of information due to non-responses should prevent large measurement errors 
for the min-max range. 
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individual but another company - which might imply a reduced risk aversion); on the control 
structure of the firms, such as the presence of shareholders’ agreements or by-laws clauses 
stabilizing control; on the concentration of ownership; and on the stability of control.  
Accounting initial values for capital stock estimation (see Appendix A1.2) and cash flow 
have been obtained from the CADS database. After merging the SIM and CADS datasets, the 
total number of observations available for the empirical analysis drops to 12,002, which appears 
to be an adequate representation of Italian manufacturing firms by size, sector and geographical 
location (see Table A1.1 in Appendix A1). 
 
3.2 Descriptive evidence: family firms in Italy 
 
 Over 70 per cent of Italian firms (with more than 50 employees) are family firms (see 
Table 1). As expected, they are more common among smaller firms (but also 30 per cent of 
those with more than 1000 employees define themselves as family controlled) and less spread in 
the Centre-North; they are more frequent in traditional sectors (textile-clothing comes first) and 
less in the energy and chemical sectors. Among non family firms we find foreign controlled 
firms, state owned ones, dispersed ownership and financially controlled companies. 
 The governance structure of family and non family firms differs (Table 2). On average, 
ownership concentration (measured by the share of the largest shareholder) is lower among 
family firms: typically the largest shareholder has a lower share with respect to non family firms, 
whereas the second and third shareholders (typically family components) have relatively larger 
shares. This could help explain why control stabilizing mechanisms – such as shareholders’ 
agreements and bylaws restricting share transfers - are more frequent among family firms. 
 The characteristics of the “head of the company” (defined in the questionnaire as the 
individual who actually manages the company) appear to differ according to the type of firm. In 
family firms, the head of the company is in fewer cases foreign, but more often a female; 
whereas the average age does not differ, the level of education does: among family firms it is 
less frequent that the head of the company has a degree or has attended specialization courses.  
 Finally, Table 3 shows that on average family firms are characterized by lower planned 
and actual investment; exports (analogously to the finding of Barba Navaretti et al., 2008), 
capital/labor ratio and labor productivity than non family firms.  
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3.3. The econometric analysis  
 
Our starting point is the assumption that the ownership structure of a firm may affect its 
investment decision through a different reaction to the uncertainty on the evolution of its 
product demand.  
A vast empirical literature has been devoted to the analysis of the investment-uncertainty 
relationship, finding generally that the relationship is negative and significant. The intensity of 
the link is however dependent on the interplay of: a) different assumptions regarding the degree 
of competition on the product market, b) technological characteristics of the production 
function (constant versus non-constant returns to scale) and of its inputs (essentially labor and 
capital). More specifically, in highly competitive markets and/or with perfectly flexible inputs 
firms should be less sensitive to uncertainty; actually, in perfectly competitive markets the sign 
of the investment-uncertainty relationship may even become positive (the so called Hartman-
Abel effect). The opposite applies for firms with some degree of market power and/or more 
irreversible or less flexible inputs. 
Following Guiso and Parigi (1996, 1999) and, more recently, Bontempi et al. (2009) we 
specify an empirical model where investment decisions are irreversible and the demand 
threshold triggering investment rises with uncertainty. In this context, Abel and Eberly (1994, 
1996, and 1997) show that the optimal trigger point is equal to the user cost of capital adjusted 
to account for irreversibility and uncertainty. By raising the user cost of capital uncertainty 
reduces the elasticity of both the decision to invest and the amount of the investment with 
respect to demand.  
This framework seems particularly useful for the analysis of the effects of ownership 
structure. If different ownership structures imply different degrees of risk aversion and this 
affects the role of irreversibility in the decision to invest, the trigger point should be higher for 
family firms, especially when these are “directly” controlled by an individual (i.e. the family 
does not control the company through a chain of other companies). 
Let γ/1)/( −= yKamvp  be the marginal value product of capital evaluated at the current 
level of the stock of capital, K , and of demand y; a is a constant and 0 1< <γ  a parameter 
representing the characteristics of the production function. Let c(u) be the user cost of capital 
which, under the hypothesis of irreversibility of investment, is positively affected by uncertainty 
about future demand, u.  
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With no adjustment costs and ignoring depreciation, the firm’s optimal level of capital 
stock is K y c u a* ( ( ) / )= −γ  and the corresponding investment policy is: 0* >−= KKI  if 
)(ucmvp >  or K y c u a< −( ( ) / ) γ . When )(ucmvp ≤ , or γ−≥ )/)(( aucyK , investment should be 
set to zero.  
The latter case would be a natural test of the irreversibility theory but it is very difficult 
to implement because observations with zero investment are extremely rare (lower than 3 per 
cent of the total number of our observations). This is true especially when using data on “total” 
investment, which aggregates different types of capital goods, such as buildings, equipment and 
so on: firms may plan zero investment in buildings but positive investment in other categories9
We therefore concentrate on the case 
. 
However, the virtual absence of zero-investment observations should not alter the relationship 
between uncertainty and the user cost of capital that is at the root of our analysis of investment 
decisions.  
)(ucmvp > , so that K y c u a* ( ( ) / )= −γ . In this 
context, the investment rate can be shown to be a function of demand, uncertainty and the 
inherited capital stock according to the following empirical equation for panel data: 
(1) ( ) 1
1
3
1
2
1
1
1 1 +
−
+++ +′++





+++= itit
it
it
it
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it
itt
ti
it
itt Z
K
I
K
Yu
K
Y
K
I
εξααατµ   
where subscripts i and t respectively indicate the ith company (i = 1, 2, …, N) and the year t (t = 
1, 2, …, T). itK is the stock of capital measured at the end of t; 1itt I +  and itI  respectively 
represent the investment planned at year t for the following year and the realized investment in 
t; 1ittY +  is the level of demand expected at the end of year t for the following year; ( )1ittYu +  
represents the firm’s uncertainty about demand in t+1 as perceived in t. All previous variables 
are measured at constant prices. itZ  is a vector of additional controls accounting for 
exceptional events, such as extraordinary operations, and 1+itε  is the stochastic error term 
measuring shocks to investment plans in t+1. Detailed definitions and data sources are in 
Appendix A1. 
                                                 
9  Bloom et al. (2003, 2007) study the irreversibility theory with aggregation effects. Guiso and Parigi (1999) present 
some estimates for three different types of capital goods, equipment, structures and vehicles, confirming the results obtained 
for the total aggregate; more recently, Bontempi et al. (2004) extend the fundamental q approach to the case of two capital 
inputs: equipment and structures. 
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Fixed effects iµ  and tτ  refer to firms and time; they account for individual 
unobservable characteristics influencing the investment-uncertainty relationship and for a 
degree of dependency over time across companies due to collectively significant effects. Hence, 
they reduce biases due to the omission of unobservable time-invariant individual effects and of 
effects almost invariant for all companies, such as industry-wide shocks, macroeconomic 
cyclical effects and widespread optimism-pessimism.  
Parameters α1, α2 and α3 are scalars, ξ is a vector. While α1 is expected to be positive, 
according to the irreversibility literature the a priori sign of α2 should be negative and 
significant; however, if the Hartman-Abel set-up applies, α2 should be positive or not 
significantly different from zero. 
In model (1) the dynamic nature of the investment decision is taken into account by 
having a positive α3 parameter measuring the effect of the lagged realized investment (i.e. the 
actual implementation of the plans in t-1 for year t, which is not the lagged dependent variable) 
to approximate the effects of the adjustment costs, delivery lags, and so on. However, since the 
available time span of twelve years (from 1996 to 2007) enables the assessment of the existence 
of more complex dynamic adjustments, we included in the model also the actual lagged 
dependent variable, exploiting the information about the investment plans made in t-1 for t. 
Equation (1) then becomes: 
(2) ( ) 1
1
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The dynamics components of equation (2), 
1it
it1t
1
1it
it
3 K
I
K
I
−
−
−
+ βα , can be rearranged such as: 



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−
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−
− 1it
it1t
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it
3 K
I
K
I
δα , where 
3
1
α
βδ −= . In this new formulation, α3 < 0  implies a long run 
adjustment of the investment plans towards the effective investments, and  δ  may be 
interpreted as a factor of correction which contributes to identify the (last) perceived gap at the 
time new investment plans are set. When  α3 + β1 = 0 , δ = 1  and firm investment plans for 
t+1 are not only a function of future demand but also of the gap between past investment plans 
and their realizations: 
11
1
−−
− −
it
it
it
itt
K
I
K
I . In other terms, the plans for t+1 include a share of the 
unrealized plans in the previous period (see Eisner, 1978). In a framework of rational 
 11 
investment plans10, the gap can only be determined by “news” (new information obtained 
between t-1 ant t), which we assume to feed back to future plans.11
 
 As such, the exclusion of 
this term from the planned investment relationship in equation (1) should not affect the α1, and 
α2 parameter estimates. 
4.  Investment decisions and uncertainty: main results 
Before we proceed with the estimation, we also consider some generalization of 
expression (2), taking into account medium and long run effects of uncertainty (see Eberly and 
van Mieghem, 1997, and Bloom et al., 2007), by considering alternative functional forms and 
other investment determinants.  
First, since the interaction between uncertainty and expected demand might actually 
capture second-order term in the Taylor approximation of the relationship between investment 
plans and expected demand, the inclusion of the squared expected demand (appropriately 
scaled by capital stock) tests for evidence of non-linearity - through the β2 parameter in 
equation (3) below.  
Secondly, it might be that uncertainty on one-year-ahead demand growth has an 
additional, direct effect on investments (i.e. not intermediated by the demand). To account for 
this, we may include in our specification alternative measures of uncertainty (such as the min-
max range of demand growth), summarized by the uit term in equation (3) below. The sign of 
the β3 parameter is a priori uncertain, while α2 captures the effects of uncertainty as suggested 
by the irreversibility literature. 
A negative effect of uncertainty on investment might also proxy for credit constraints: if 
they are due to the company’s inherent riskiness, this would imply that riskier firms may be 
more liquidity-constrained and hence plan a lower amount of investments. This possibility is 
addressed by including a measure of the firm’s cash flow net of dividend paid, CFit, to take into 
account liquidity constraints. 
By considering these extensions, equation (2) becomes: 
                                                 
10  As tested in Guiso and Parigi (1999). 
11  In an extended framework, equation (2) can be interpreted as the planned investments relationship of a (two-
equations) vector equilibrium correction model explaining both sides of the adjustment process between plans and actual 
investments; as far as the adjustment model for actual investment is concerned. See, e.g., Bloom et al. (2003, 2007). 
 12 
(3) 
( )
1
1
1
43
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
3
1
2
1
1
1 1
+
−
−+
−
−
−
+++
+′+++
+++





+++=
itit
it
it
it
it
itt
it
itt
it
it
it
itt
it
itt
ti
it
itt
Z
K
CFu
K
Y
K
I
K
I
K
Yu
K
Y
K
I
εξβββ
βααατα
 
Equation (3) is our general model, and its estimates are reported in the first three 
columns of Table 4, respectively for the family and the non-family sample, and for the sum of 
the two subsets (family & non family)12
Having a dynamic panel model, we apply the GMM estimators proposed by Arellano 
and Bond (1991) and instrument not only the lagged dependent variable but all other 
determinants as well; the comparison of alternative estimators is presented in Appendix A.2. 
. 
All the diagnostic tests in Table 4 show a basic congruence of our model with data. 
Moving from the general model (columns (1)-(3)) to more restricted ones, all the extensions 
considered above (i.e., squared demand effects, uncertainty levels and credit constraints) appear 
to be never significant both for the family and non family subsamples as well as for their union 
(see the p-values of the null hypothesis that β2 = β3 = β4 = 0 in the last row of Table 4). This is 
why in the remainder of the paper we will consider equation (2) as our baseline model. 
Columns (4) and (5) report the results for the “intermediate” model in equation (2), 
which show remarkable differences between the estimates of the core parameters for the family 
and non family samples. Family firms plans appear to be more reactive to expected demand: for 
a given level of uncertainty, the elasticity of investment plans to expected demand is four times 
as higher than for non family firms. However, family firms investment decisions are more 
sensitive to uncertainty: the uncertainty parameter α2 estimate appears to be significant and 
higher in absolute terms in the family subsample (it is not even significant in the non family 
sample). In this case, a reduction of the degree of uncertainty from the third to the first quartile 
of its subsample distribution induces an increase in planned investments of approximately 2% 
for the median family firm, while investment plans of non-families are nearly unchanged (in the 
whole sample, the low α2 estimates - though statistically significant - implies a mere 0.25% 
increase in investment plans associated to an equal uncertainty reduction). 
                                                 
12  Additional sensitivity analyses were conducted by including in model (3) the uncertainty measure in differences, 
further lags of the cash flow variable and alternative credit rationing indicators as suggested by Guiso and Parigi (1999). 
Since parameter estimates of these variables are largely not significant while the other model’s estimates do not depart from 
the baseline results in Table 4, they are not reported but available upon request. 
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Differences between family and non family firms emerge also from the estimates of the 
dynamic components of the model. The results in column (7) show that family firms 
investment plans embody about 40% of the gap between previous year plans and realizations, 
thus suggesting that their investment decision may follow a sort of adaptive behavior. This 
could be interpreted as an indication that family firms plans are more influenced by a longer 
term perspective. In effect, non family firms - column (8) – seem to follow a sort of 
autoregressive behavior, as more than 10% of their future plans is explained by the level of 
their past plans. 
 
5. The sources of irreversibility 
 The next step in our analysis is to identify what drives the sensitivity to uncertainty for 
family firms. Even if relevant by itself, this result might be better understood – in its positive 
and negative implications – only by addressing its underlying sources. In the literature, a 
number of factors have been shown to help explain the responsiveness of investment to 
uncertainty: capital irreversibility, market power, risk aversion (see e.g. Guiso and Parigi, 1999, 
and Bontempi et al., 2009).  
 
5.1 Investments’ irreversibility and market power? 
 It might be argued that the strong reactivity of family firms plans to uncertainty is due 
either to a larger share of irreversible investments and/or to their higher market power (or 
lower competition) in the sectors where they are active.  
The average value of some of our variables for family and non family firms might give 
some support to this interpretation (see Table 3). In fact, only 74% of family firms bought 
capital goods on second hand markets, as compared to 79% of non family firms; buildings 
(highly non reversible) represent a larger share of investments for family than for non family 
firms. This might suggest that family firms investments are actually – for some reasons – more 
irreversible. 
Some support – at the descriptive level – receives also the hypothesis of higher market 
power of family firms (their price-cost margins are on average higher) and/or lower exposure 
to intense competition (family firms export a lower share of their output). 
In order to test whether results for family firms as in column (4) of Table 4 might have 
been due to irreversibility and market power effects, we run a sequence of stability tests for the 
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main parameters of interest (α1, α2, α3 and β1 in equation 2). The testing strategy is based on 
the inclusion in (2) the interaction of each regressor (expected demand, uncertainty, and lags of 
actual and planned investments) with a dummy variable selecting family firms with either 
reversible capital or high market power: under the null hypothesis of no break, the estimates of 
the interaction terms should not be significant. 
The first four columns of Table 5 show the p-values of the standard normal statistic of 
the shift of each parameter of interest (the last column reports the p-values of the χ2 statistic 
corresponding to the joint null of no shift). The overall picture is fairly clear: notwithstanding 
the different proxies used both for capital irreversibility and market power, it appears that the 
investment-uncertainty relationship in the family firms case cannot be simply due to the joint 
effect of a higher market power and/or a higher irreversibility of the capital stock.  
 
 
5.2 Irreversibility due to opaqueness? 
Up to now, we have considered a standard definition of irreversibility which is 
associated to the existence of a secondary market for (used) capital goods. The results of the 
previous section seem to suggest that we should adopt a broader concept of irreversibility, by 
taking explicitly into account the role of information on the secondary markets. More 
specifically, it might be that family firms investments are “perceived” by the market to be more 
irreversible because they carry a kind of “lemon” risk: this might be due to the fact that family 
firms are more opaque, hence less information is available on the actual value of their 
investments, which might become sunk for this reason13
The relevance of this effect may be tested indirectly, by observing that firms tend to be 
more opaque where law enforcement is less efficient or where trust among agents is lower. We 
take this into account by using proxies for both trust and law enforcement, our hypothesis 
being that a high trust and/or a good law enforcement should reduce the opaqueness of family 
firms and - through this mechanism - the irreversibility of their investment. 
.  
We proxy the level of trust with an average of the “trust” measure from the World 
Value Survey over the two waves where Italy was included (and alternatively with a measure of 
social capital based on blood donation and election turnout). As a proxy of the effectiveness of 
                                                 
13  We are grateful to Luigi Guiso for this suggestion. 
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law enforcement we use the length of ordinary civil proceedings in Italian provinces for the 
years 2000-2005 (a long length means low enforcement).  
Results are presented in Table 6 and show that family firms’ investments are in fact 
more sensitive to uncertainty in columns (3) and (5), where trust is lower than its median level 
or when law enforcement is worse than its median value.14
Overall, the results of the last two sections show that the higher uncertainty effect on 
family firms investment plans is not associated to a greater investment irreversibility in a 
standard sense but rather to a different type of irreversibility, enhanced by the environment. In 
areas where trust is lower or enforcement is worse family firms’ capital stock seems to be less 
easily evaluated by the market and hence more sunk. This induces a greater caution in the 
investment process. Under this respect, the greater sensitivity to uncertainty of family firms is 
rather a sign of a backward and inefficient environment. We shall come back to this issue when 
we try to understand where family firms are more common. 
 These results are robust to the use 
of other measures related to social capital, such as blood donation and election turnout (results 
are available upon request).  
 
5.3 Risk aversion due to concentrated wealth  
Another factor which may influence the relationship between investments and 
uncertainty in the context of family firms is the degree of risk aversion of the agent controlling 
the firm. A common assumption is that, since the owner might have a large share of its wealth 
invested in the firm, this induces a higher risk aversion and hence a greater sensitivity to 
uncertainty. 
Given the lack of data on the share of the owner’s wealth which is sunk in the firm, we 
try nonetheless to evaluate the uncertainty effects by considering: a) firms where the owner is 
an individual and b) cases where ownership concentration is high: if the controlling agent’s 
wealth were diversified across a number of investments (and hence not concentrated in the 
firm), it should not make a difference whether the firms is controlled by an individual with a 
high or low ownership share.  
Focusing the analysis specifically on family firms where the largest direct shareholder is 
an individual (about 58% of all the 620 family firms in our sample) allows to take into account 
                                                 
14  Opposite to what just described for family firms, non families do not support a change in planned investments 
reactiveness to uncertainty conditional to different degrees of trust and/or law enforcement. Non family firms never 
present a significant effect of uncertainty on investment plans, independently of the subsample on which we refer to.  
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those cases where it is more likely that the owner has invested a large share of wealth in the 
firm (whereas for a family firm which is controlled through other companies – e.g. a pyramid - 
it might be more likely that each single owner has managed to diversify her investments).  
The results of the estimation of (2) in this specific case are reported in the first four 
columns of Table 7. Along the columns, estimation is performed using alternative samples of 
data: all the family firms (F, in column 1); all the observations for family-firms directly 
controlled by an individual (FM, column 2); only observations for family-firms directly 
controlled by an individual, where the first owner’s share is lower than 60% (FMB, column 3); 
only observations for family-firms directly controlled by an individual, where the first owner’s 
share is larger than 60% (FMA, column 4).  
The 60% threshold used in columns (3) and (4) is the average share of the largest owner 
in our sample but it is obviously arbitrary; hence, following Domowitz et al. (1986), we also 
consider an alternative specification of equation (2) which includes a new variable given by the 
interaction between uncertainty and variations in ownership concentration, Xit:  
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In the simplest case (see column 5), Xit is the share of the largest shareholder, entailing 
the assumption of a linear relationship between the size of the (negative) uncertainty effect and 
that share. The uncertainty effect grows with the share if ω < 0. In addition, the subsequent 
columns (6) and (7) respectively report the estimation results of equation (4) where the 
relationship between uncertainty and the share is assumed to be log-linear and inverse.15
 As expected, the larger financial involvement of the largest shareholder leads to a 
substantial increase in the sensitivity to uncertainty (see the value of 
 
2αˆ  in column (2) and the 
correspondent semi-elasticity of plans to uncertainty, which more than doubles, from 2.00 for 
the full sample of family firms to 5.43).  
Estimates in columns (3) and (4) in Table 7 suggest that also ownership concentration 
matters: if the largest owner’s share is above 60%, the absolute value of 2αˆ  further increases. 
Given the small sample size on which these estimates are based, it is probably more informative 
to analyze the results in the last three columns of Table 7, where the parameters of equation (4) 
are estimated over the larger sample (as in column 2) under alternative assumptions about the 
                                                 
15 Though not reported, the restrictions that lead from the general to the models in Table 7 are never rejected, and the 
diagnostic tests support the validity of the specification. 
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uncertainty-share relationship. In column (5) the effect of uncertainty on investment plans for 
family firms controlled by an individual varies over time and across individuals according the 
linear relationship: 0934.00704.0ˆ it,2 −−=α *largest shareholder, where ωˆ  is significantly negative at 
the 10% level. Hence ownership concentration seems to proxy the share of the owner’s wealth 
invested in the company: when this increases, sensitivity to uncertainty increases. 
The result is robust to the two different specifications in columns (6) and (7), The 
alternative patterns of the uncertainty effect on investment plans with respect to growing shares 
of the first owner are reported in top-down plots of Figure 1 for: (a) the linear specification, (b) 
the logarithmic and (c) the inverse one, together with the two α2 estimates in the below/above 
60% subsamples, see columns (3) and (4) of Table 7. All results point to a substantial increase 
of investment plans sensitivity to uncertainty when the share of the first owner is higher16
 
.  
5.4  Some extensions 
a) More complex structures (groups vs non groups). We also distinguish more generally between family 
firms belonging to a group and those which do not. Being in a group might reduce the 
sensitivity of investment to uncertainty, if this is mainly related to the concentration of the 
owner’s wealth in the company. A more complex and structured organization might imply that 
a lower share of the controlling agent’s wealth is directly involved in the company we are 
considering and that internal capital markets in the group allow resources to be allocated in a 
way to relax some of the constraints to investments. 
 In Table 8 we split the family firms sample in column (1) into those which do and do 
not belong to a group, column 2 and 3 respectively. As expected, being part of a group induces 
a significantly lower investment sensitivity to uncertainty.  
 
b) The “founder” effect. We also checked whether some “specificities” in ownership and control 
structure might have affected our results or might help to qualify them. In order to relate with 
the literature on a positive “founder” effect on the firms’ performance, we tested whether a 
stable control since the firm’s foundation affects the responsiveness of family firms to 
uncertainty; results are in Table 9. 
                                                 
16  It is interesting to notice that, if we repeat the exercise for non family firms (where the threshold for the largest 
owner share is below/above 96%, corresponding to the third quartile of the share distribution for NF, 2αˆ  for concentrated 
ownership is negative and significant whereas for low concentration firms is not. The value of 2αˆ  is however half of that of 
corresponding family firms.  
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When the controlling agent is the founder as defined in the 2002 survey (see column 2 in 
Table 9 17
Other measures of the stability of control (such as the presence of shareholders’ 
agreements or bylaws restricting share transfers) do not seem to affect the results, implying that 
it is not stability per se which increases or reduces the responsiveness to uncertainty
), uncertainty has a stronger effect on investment plans than that in the whole sample 
of family firms (in column 1, where results are reported again to ease comparisons). This might 
be due to a stronger desire of keeping the control of the firm that may induce a higher risk 
aversion. This result is interesting especially if compared with those in the literature finding that 
founder family firms perform better than the others: founder family firms might be in general 
more profitable (due to the specific ability of the founder), but might be also more risk averse.  
18
 As a whole we have found that investment behavior of family firms is strongly affected 
by uncertainty and that this uncertainty is partly associated to firms’ control structure (e.g. 
ownership concentration), an endogenous variable, and partly to the environment, exogenous 
to firms’ choices.  
. 
The ultimate effects of these characteristics of family firms’ behavior has to be further 
explored. We have seen (Table 3) that on average they show (over the whole period considered) 
a lower productivity: it might be that, since on average the uncertainty over demand has been 
relatively similar for family and non family firms, this has produced lower investment patters 
and hence in the medium term, lower productivity. 
 
6. Why so many family firms? 
 The results in the previous sections show that family firms are characterised by a high 
sensitivity to uncertainty, stemming from a broad concept of irreversibility - where 
considerations about the quality and the availability of information on the firm matter more 
than the economic and physical characteristics of the capital goods - and from a higher degree 
of risk aversion of the owner. These factors may have weighted on the investment decision 
process of the firms, with negative repercussions on their long term performance. Yet, family 
firms continue to be fairly numerous, in Italy as well as in other countries, putting this issue on 
top of the research agenda. 
 In the literature (see e.g., Bertrand and Schoar, 2006, for a survey), family firms are 
alternatively considered as an “efficient device”, which allows to obtain a superior performance, 
                                                 
17  The results do not change when the founder is defined according to the 2006 survey (see column 5). 
18  The results are available upon request. 
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or are “culturally determined” objects, whose values may induce certain behavior of the 
founder (or heirs) implying to forego financial returns in order to maximize her (their) overall 
utility. 
 According to the first set of theories, family firms may have a longer term horizon, 
entailing less “short-termism” and myopia. They might ensure better incentives and stricter 
(and less costly) monitoring on management. Moreover, within the family the transmission of 
knowledge might be easier, especially in sectors of activity closer to artisan-like production (but 
less where an external education is more relevant or where technological innovation matters). 
 On the other hand, family firms might emerge due to “cultural values”, not necessarily 
associated to economic efficiency. These might induce an “excessive” desire to keep control 
within the family, with a long term (possibly excessive) commitment to the survival of the 
company itself. The idea that a culture based on strong family ties may limit development is not 
new (see Bertand and Schoar, 2006; Bertrand et al., 2008): Weber claims that family values may 
restrain the development of capitalist economic activities which need more individualism and 
less nepotism. Banfield (1958) suggests that the “amoral familism” in the South of Italy induces 
small firm size and slower development: there might be a trade-off between trust among small 
groups of kins and trust in the society at large. A similar argument is put forward by Fukuyama 
(1995). Furthermore, if the founder is mainly interested in keeping the company within the 
family, this might induce her to select her successor among (the rather small set of) her heirs 
rather than on the market, with negative effects on efficiency (Burkart et al., 2003). Another 
possibility (not exclusive with respect to the previous one) is that family ties serve as a second 
best solution where legal structures are weak: trust between family members can be a substitute 
for missing contractual enforcement (or more specifically for weak investor protection).  
 At the international level there is not a clear consensus on the accepted explanation (see 
Betrand and Schoar, 2006): family firms appear to be more common in countries where “family 
values” (proxied by the responses to the World Value Survey) are more important.  
Hence the question is why do we have such a large number of family firms in Italy? 
Given our results that – at least in certain circumstances – they appear to have a longer term 
perspective but might be a source of competitive disadvantage, it seems relevant to analyze the 
reasons of the diffusion of this governance structure.  
The model explaining the share of family on total firms by region or by province 
(shareFg) is obtained by averaging over g (where g denotes a region or province) the individual 
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binary choices19
(5) 
 of the firms belonging to g. If we assume that the individual choice to be or 
not to be a family depends on the institutional and social environment in which firms operate 
(listed in the explanatory vector W) plus a random shock εi measuring the i-th firm preferences 
and assessment about such environmental features, the aggregate model becomes:  
ggg WconstshareF εγ ++=   
 Equation (5) explains the share of family firms in g using a number of variables related 
to the institutional and social framework (Wg), proxied by the level of trust and social capital, 
the effectiveness of legal enforcement and the efficiency of the public administration. 
Obviously some of them (especially the “trust” variable) might be endogenous, but most of 
these independent variables are extremely persistent over time (however, we do not know how 
persistent is the family firm relevance). In the regressions we also control for the level of 
development by introducing per capita GDP. Table A1.2 in Appendix A1 lists and describes all 
the variables in W.  
 Since in equation (5) the random shock εg (which averages over g individual εi ) is 
heteroskedastic (its variance depends on the number of firms in g) parameters are estimated 
through generalized least squares by assuming that the errors variance is positively related to 
the number of firms in g.  
We consider two alternative specifications. In one specification the first principal 
component has been extracted from the explicative variables in W; given the strong collinearity 
among these variables a single factor (F1g ) explaining about the 65% of the total variation in W 
data has been identified20
In a second specification, all the independent variables have been included and the most 
efficient specification selected: in this case, the significant variables appear to be trust, the length 
of civil proceedings (duration) and the administrative costs for starting a business (cost). The 
same model is also estimated by using log-transformed regressors. 
.  
Results in Table 10 refer to both regional (columns 1-3) and provincial (columns 4-6) 
data aggregation levels. Specifically, columns (1) and (4) present results obtained using the first 
                                                 
19  The 0-1 indicator is available from SIM database since the year 2006. In what follows we report results obtained by 
using data about 2007, but they are robust to the use of the year 2006. 
20  The weights to compute F1g from W data are reported in the last two columns of Table A1.2 for respectively 
regional and provincial data: alternative levels of data aggregation lead to a very similar structure of parameters and their 
signs suggest that the more favorable the environment for business is, the more positive F1g . 
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specification, columns (2) and (5) the second, and columns (3) and (6) those using the log-linear 
transformation of the same explanatory variables. 
These findings, even  if obviously deserving further analysis, are in line with other results 
on the determinants of the size of Italian companies (Cingano, Pinotti, 2009) and suggest that 
the reasons for the prevalence of this model might be searched also in long standing 
characteristics of Italian institutions (and their inefficiency). 
 
7. Conclusions 
 In the paper we offer a contribution to the understanding of the behavior of family 
firms by considering their investment decision process as compared to non family firms.  
By doing this we also offer some insights to the literature that compares the 
performance of family and non family firms. The investment decisions of family firms appear 
to be more sensitive to uncertainty than those of other firms. This behavior appears to be 
associated both to the irreversibility of investment decisions, especially due to an environment 
that enhances the opacity of family firms, and to a greater risk aversion of family firms.  
 While this suggests that investment behavior of family firms might be a source of 
limited growth, the analysis of the actual link between investment decisions and productivity 
and output growth requires obviously further investigations.  
 Some preliminary evidence on the determinants of the diffusion of this governance 
structure in Italy suggests the relevance of institutional factors such as the level of trust among 
people (so that family links might substitute for more impersonal ones), the degree of 
inefficiency of the judicial system (possibly reducing the degree of protection for external 
financiers)  and the inefficiency of local administrations (which might be an obstacle to further 
growth). This suggests that – even if in a number of cases it might be and efficient governance 
structure – a family firm structure might often represent a second best response to an 
inefficient environment. 
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Table 1 - RELEVANCE OF FAMILY FIRMS IN ITALY  
 % of firms 
 
N. of firms 71.10 
Employment 55.1 
Revenues 39.1 
Size (by employees) 
 
  50 – 100 76.8 
 100 – 200  69.7 
 200 – 500 61.5 
 500 – 1000 50.4 
   > 1000 30.4 
Area 
 
   North – Center 70.1 
   South – Islands 79.7 
Sectors 
 
    Food Tobacco 77.1 
    Textile – clothing 80.9 
    Chemicals 53.5 
    Non met. Minerals 74.0 
    Mechanical 72.9 
    Wood, paper 73.9 
    Extraction, energy 31.3 
Source: SIM Database, 2006. 
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Table 2 - CHARACTERISTICS OF FAMILY VS NON FAMILY FIRMS 
  
Family firms 
 
 
Non family firms 
Largest shareholder 62.6 82.5 
2nd largest shareholder 18.1 8.1 
3rd largest shareholder 8.0 2.4 
   
Median n. of shareholders 3 2 
% of shareholders’ agreement 12.8 10.8 
% of bylaws restricting transf.of shares 49.8 36.5 
   
Head of firm: 
 
  
Nationality   
     Italian 98.2 94.5 
     Eu 1.3 4.1 
     Rest of world 
 
0.5 1.3 
Gender   
     Male 90.2 91.7 
     Female 
 
9.8 8.3 
Education   
     Middle school 9.1 5.3 
     Secondary 45.5 35.1 
     Degree 40.9 49.8 
     Post degree 3.8 5.4 
     Specialization 
 
0.8 4.4 
Age 56.9 55.3 
Source: SIM Database, 2006. 
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Table 3 SAMPLE MEANS OF SELECTED VARIABLES 
  
Family 
 
Non 
family 
 
Family and 
Non family 
 
Manuf. 
firms 
Continuous Variables 1     
Planned investment/stock of capital 0.148 0.160 0.153 0.158 
Actual investment/stock of capital 0.171 0.176 0.173 0.179 
Expected demand/stock of capital 5.61 6.08 5.83 5.89 
Actual demand/stock of capital 5.78 6.26 6.00 6.15 
Demand uncertainty measure 2 0.457 0.473 0.464 0.481 
Min-max range of expected demand 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.087 
Buildings/total investment 0.171 0.131 0.153 0.150 
Cash flow/stock of capital 0.296 0.288 0.292 0.282 
Price-cost margin, PCM 0.089 0.070 0.080 0.076 
Share of exported output 0.351 0.378 0.364 0.359 
Capital/labour ratio 52.8 90.7 70.5 65.3 
Output/labour ratio 188.5 226.5 206.2 198.9 
Dummy variables     
Credit rationed firms 0.035 0.023 0.029 0.036 
Geographic location     
- North-west 0.360 0.399 0.378 0.384 
- North-east 0.125 0.157 0.140 0.152 
- Centre 0.261 0.300 0.280 0.268 
- South 0.255 0.143 0.203 0.197 
Firms producing only one product 0.351 0.323 0.338 0.337 
Employees ≤ 100 0.374 0.230 0.307 0.313 
100 < Employees ≤ 500 0.524 0.560 0.541 0.539 
Employees > 500 0.102 0.211 0.153 0.148 
Reversible capital 3 0.740 0.792 0.765 0.776 
Observations  4506 3932 8438 12002 
Number of firms  1009 796 1805 2959 
Average T 4.47 4.94 4.67 4.06 
(1) Measured at constant prices (1994=1). (2) Min-max range of expected demand growth times the 
level of demand over the stock of capital. (3) A company has “reversibility capital” if it uses the 
opportunity to buy in the second-hand and/or in the leasing markets at least once during the sample 
period. 
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Table 4 - FROM GENERAL-TO-SPECIFIC MODELLING APPROACH (1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
model: general (3) intermediate (4) specific 
sample (2): F NF F&NF F NF F&NF F NF F&NF 
α1 0.0171 0.0090 0.0099 0.0190 0.0050 0.0073 0.0183 0.0049 0.0072 
 0.0051 0.0040 0.0037 0.0056 0.0020 0.0030 0.0055 0.002 0.0031 
α2 -0.0488 -0.0069 -0.0095 -0.0592 -0.0142 -0.0213 -0.0603 -0.0141 -0.0215 
 0.0188 0.0101 0.0082 0.0172 0.0167 0.0093 0.0173 0.0166 0.0091 
α3 -0.3046 -0.0138 -0.2396 -0.3589 0.0128 -0.2754 -0.4121  -0.2879 
 0.1651 0.0513 0.1793 0.1671 0.0555 0.2007 0.1225  0.0747 
β1 0.4266 0.1271 0.2675 0.4494 0.1206 0.2853 0.4121 0.1259 0.2879 
 0.1147 0.0246 0.0910 0.1052 0.0256 0.0987 0.1225 0.0094 0.0747 
β2  
(5) -0.0002 -0.0100 -0.0086       
 0.0160 0.0063 0.0055       
β3 -0.0901 0.1399 -0.1549       
 0.1045 0.1300 0.1068       
β4 0.0368 0.0193 0.0254       
 0.0249 0.0214 0.0184       
Elasticity to:          
exp. demand    0.80 0.19 0.30 0.77 0.18 0.29 
    0.23 0.07 0.12 0.23 0.07 0.12 
uncertainty(6)    2.04 0.10 0.25 2.00 0.10 0.25 
    0.87 0.13 0.16 0.83 0.13 0.16 
N 613 554 1167 620 556 1176 620 556 1176 
Tbar 3.6 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 
N×T 2228 1952 4180 2258 1987 4245 2258 1987 4245 
AC: (7)          
- 1st order 0.0022 0.0507 0.0011 0.0016 0.0480 0.0011 0.0108 0.0477 0.0016 
- 2nd order 0.2732 0.7109 0.3846 0.3318 0.7437 0.4141 0.5396 0.7623 0.5335 
Hansen (8) 0.6256 0.2368 0.2112 0.3414 0.2317 0.1802 0.3232 0.2412 0.1461 
R2  (9) 0.193 0.074 0.097 0.171 0.098 0.101 0.141 0.098 0.097 
restrictions(10)    0.4520 0.2486 0.1061 0.2681 0.2259 0.1906 
(1) In bold, the GMM-dif estimates, see Arellano and Bond (1991); below there are the heteroschedasticity-
consistent standard errors. (2) F = family firm; NF = non-family firm; F&NF = union of the two subsets. (3) See 
equation (3). (4) See equation (2). (5) Being the explanatory variable measured in millions, β2 estimates reported in 
this table must be divided by 106. (6) % change of planned investments due to a reduction of uncertainty - for the 
median firm - from the third to the first quartile of the corresponding sub-sample distribution. (7) AC = p-values of 
the residual autocorrelation tests, see Arellano and Bond (1991). (8) P-values of the overidentifying restriction J-
test, see Hansen (1982). (9) Squared correlation of actual and fitted data. (10) P-value of the χ2 statistic testing for 
the joint parameters restrictions to the corresponding general model in the first three columns. 
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Table 5 – TEST FOR SHIFTS IN FAMILY MODEL PARAMETERS1 
Shifted parameters: α1 α2 α3 β1 Joint 
Shift drivers:      
Reversibility measures 2      
- Strong  0.348 0.871 0.109 0.445 0.258 
- Weak, REV1 0.121 0.870 0.340 0.668 0.450 
- Weak, REV2 0.856 0.665 0.211 0.523 0.624 
- Weak, REV3 0.432 0.317 0.560 0.483 0.667 
Market power measures      
- Price-cost margin below the sample median 0.120 0.188 0.827 0.209 0.375 
- Share of exported output below the sample median 0.885 0.836 0.039 0.947 0.285 
(1) For equation (2) single parameter shifts, the P-values of the standard normal statistics are reported; for equation 
(2) joint parameter shifts the P-values of the χ2-statistics are reported. (2) The reversibility indicators are obtained on 
the basis of the SIM information about transactions in the secondary market for capital goods and about leasing 
investment (see Bontempi et al., 2009, Appendix A.3). The strong reversibility indicator is obtained on the basis of 
single cases (company-year): reversibility occurs when the ith company at time t explicitly uses the opportunity to buy 
in the second-hand and/or in the leasing markets.. The weak reversibility indicator is based on all the cases relating to 
the same company: a company belongs to the reversibility group if it uses the opportunity to buy in the second-hand 
and/or in the leasing markets at least once (REV1), twice (REV2) or three times (REV3) during the sample period. 
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Table 6 – FAMILY FIRMS WHERE TRUST AND ENFORCEMENT ARE HIGH/LOW 1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
                      Trust                Enforcement 
sample: (2) F high low high low 
α1 0.0190 0.0166 0.0241 0.0126 0.0299 
 0.0056 0.0059 0.0064 0.0054 0.0066 
α2 -0.0592 -0.0470 -0.1214 -0.0396 -0.0827 
 0.0172 0.0104 0.0302 0.0142 0.0202 
α3 -0.3589 -0.5142 0.0094 -0.3421 -0.0346 
 0.1671 0.1587 0.0439 0.1579 0.0591 
β1 0.4494 0.4019 0.1726 0.1652 0.2412 
 0.1052 0.0675 0.0931 0.0704 0.0760 
δ   (3) 1.25 0.78 - 0.49 - 
 0.37 0.18 - 0.27 - 
Elasticity to:      
expected. demand 0.80 0.70 0.99 0.53 1.24 
 0.23 0.25 0.26 0.22 0.27 
uncertainty  (4) 2.04 1.41 5.30 0.90 4.46 
 0.87 0.56 2.05 0.42 1.50 
N 620 259 315 365 354 
Tbar 3.6 4.1 3.4 3.1 3.2 
N×T 2258 1053 1060 1115 1120 
R2  (5) 0.171 0.236 0.081 0.033 0.153 
(1) In bold, the GMM-dif estimates of equation (2) parameters (“intermediate model”), see Arellano 
and Bond (1991); below there are the heteroschedasticity-consistent standard errors. (2) F = family 
firm; high/low trust (enforcement) = family firms which are based in areas where trust (enforcement) 
is above/below the median value (excluding the observations lying on median values). (3) The 
indirect estimates and the corresponding standard errors of  δ  are computed from  δ  = -β1 / α3  only  
when α3  parameter is significantly different from zero. (4) % change of planned investments due to a 
reduction of uncertainty - for the median firm - from the third to the first quartile of the corresponding 
sub-sample distribution. (5) Squared correlation of actual and fitted data. 
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Table 7 - FAMILY FIRMS MANAGED BY AN INDIVIDUAL: LOW / HIGH  CONCENTRATION  (1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
sample: (2) F FM FMB FMA  FM  
interaction: (3)     linear log inverse 
α1 0.0190 0.0329 0.0254 0.0800 0.0364 0.0357 0.0361 
 0.0056 0.0106 0.0113 0.0261 0.114 0.108 0.108 
α2 -0.0592 -0.0860 -0.0877 -0.0921 -0.0704 -0.1400 -0.1337 
 0.0172 0.0163 0.0195 0.0346 0.0113 0.0402 0.0361 
ω     -0.0934 -0.0295 0.0068 
     0.0633 0.0189 0.0044 
α3 -0.3589 -0.4137 -0.3788 0.0640 -0.4520 -0.4458 -0.4442 
 0.1671 0.184 0.1963 0.1216 0.1729 0.1760 0.1777 
β1 0.4494 0.3524 0.3295 0.1256 0.3448 0.3341 0.3290 
 0.1052 0.1009 0.1162 0.1043 0.0958 0.0994 0.1016 
δ   (4) 1.25 0.85 0.87 - 0.76 0.75 0.74 
 0.37 0.26 0.35 - 0.23 0.24 0.24 
Elasticity to:        
exp. demand 0.80 1.51 1.13 3.90 1.69 1.62 1.65 
 0.23 0.49 0.51 1.26 0.53 0.50 0.50 
uncertainty (5) 2.04 5.43 4.12 15.13 8.18 10.60 9.02 
 0.87 1.76 1.76 8.48 2.46 3.61 2.90 
N 620 362 254 108 355 355 355 
Tbar 3.6 3.3 3.4 3.0 3.2 3.2 3.2 
N×T 2258 1180 851 329 1143 1143 1143 
R2  (6) 0.171 0.138 0.149 0.231 0.126 0.126 0.122 
(1) Equation (2) for columns (1)-(4); equation (4) for columns (5)-(7). In bold the GMM-dif estimates, see 
Arellano and Bond (1991); below there are the heteroschedasticity-consistent standard errors. (2) F = all 
family firms; FM = family with a managing person; FMB = FM with the share of the first owner below 60%; 
FMA = FM with the share of the first owner above 60%. (3) Equation (4) in which the share of the first 
owner interacts with the uncertainty effect; the share respectively enters as a linear, logarithmic and 
inverse function. (4) The indirect estimates and the corresponding standard errors of  δ  are computed 
from  δ  = -β1 / α3  only  when α3  parameter is significantly different from zero. (5) % change of planned 
investments due to a reduction of uncertainty - for the median firm - from the third to the first quartile of 
the corresponding sub-sample distribution. (6) Squared correlation of actual and fitted data. 
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                  Table 8 - FAMILY FIRMS IN/OUT OF GROUP  (1) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 all family firms  group non group 
    
α1 0.0190 0.0167 0.0219 
 0.0056 0.0053 0.0091 
α2 -0.0592 -0.0362 -0.0689 
 0.0172 0.0183 0.0161 
α3 -0.3589 -0.0179 -0.4176 
 0.1671 0.0449 0.1833 
β1 0.4494 0.1159 0.3807 
 0.1052 0.0817 0.0999 
δ   (2) 1.25 - 0.91 
 0.37 - 0.27 
Elasticity to:    
exp. demand 0.80 0.67 0.95 
 0.23 0.21 0.39 
uncertainty(3) 2.04 1.06 2.82 
 0.87 0.60 1.24 
N 620 243 392 
Tbar 3.6 3.5 3.2 
N×T 2258 844 1246 
R2  (4) 0.171 0.045 0.168 
(1) Equation (2); in bold the GMM-dif estimates, see Arellano and Bond (1991); below 
there are the heteroschedasticity-consistent standard errors. (2) The indirect estimates 
and the corresponding standard errors of  δ  are computed from  δ  = -β1 / α3  only  when 
α3  parameter is significantly different from zero. (3) % change of planned investments 
due to a reduction of uncertainty - for the median firm - from the third to the first quartile 
of the corresponding sub-sample distribution. (4) Squared correlation of actual and fitted 
data. 
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Table 9 - FAMILY FIRMS AND CONTROL SINCE FOUNDATION 1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
sample: (2) F FF FNF FM FMF 
α1 0.0190 0.0223 0.0077 0.0329 0.0449 
 0.0056 0.0079 0.0081 0.0106 0.0149 
α2 -0.0592 -0.0717 -0.2119 -0.0860 -0.0763 
 0.0172 0.0231 0.1593 0.0163 0.0120 
α3 -0.3589 -0.4912 -0.2026 -0.4137 -0.4492 
 0.1671 0.1942 0.0844 0.1839 0.1851 
β1 0.4494 0.4148 0.3275 0.3524 0.3063 
 0.1052 0.0439 0.0919 0.1009 0.1230 
δ   (3) 1.25 0.84 1.61 0.85 0.68 
 0.37 0.31 0.48 0.26 0.26 
Elasticity to:      
exp. demand 0.80 1.05 0.32 1.51 2.15 
 0.23 0.37 0.35 0.49 0.71 
uncertainty(4) 2.04 3.89 2.88 5.43 7.39 
 0.87 1.97 1.58 1.76 2.90 
N 620 112 81 362 205 
Tbar 3.6 4.1 4.3 3.3 3.3 
N×T 2258 463 345 1180 681 
R2  (5) 0.171 0.319 0.267 0.138 0.106 
(1) In bold the GMM-dif estimates of equation (2), see Arellano and Bond (1991); below there are the 
heteroschedasticity-consistent standard errors. (2) F = all family firms; FF = family firms controlled by 
the founder (from the SIM survey on 2002); FNF = family firms controlled by following generations of 
the founder (from the survey on 2002); FM = family with a managing person; FMF = FM controlled 
since foundation. (3) The indirect estimates and the corresponding standard errors of  δ  are 
computed from  δ  = -β1 / α3  only  when α3  parameter is significantly different from zero.. (4) % 
change of planned investments due to a reduction of uncertainty - for the median firm - from the third 
to the first quartile of the corresponding sub-sample distribution. (5) Squared correlation of actual and 
fitted data. 
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Table 10 – SHARE OF FAMILY FIRMS BY REGION AND BY PROVINCE 1 
 data by region  data by province 
 (1)  (2)  (3)   (4)  (5)  (6)  
 factor  linear  log-linear   factor  linear  log-linear  
Explanatory               
F1 -0.0702 ***       -0.0751 ***     
 0.0211       0.0151      
trust   -0.6446 * -0.2280 **     -0.7827 *** -0.2454 *** 
   0.3295  0.1020     0.2657  0.0793  
duration   0.0004 *** 0.3108 **    0.0003 *** 0.2484 *** 
   0.0001  0.1147     0.0001  0.0659  
cost   -0.0086 ** -0.1281      -0.0062 ** -0.1046 * 
   0.0037  0.0766     0.0028  0.0561  
const 0.5911 *** 0.5670 ** -1.4089 **   0.5819  0.7022 *** -1.0709 *** 
 0.0213  0.1943  0.6348   0.0152  0.1444  0.3728  
Obs. 20  20  20    95  95  95  
R2 0.381  0.639  0.596    0.209  0.306  0.305  
SER 0.0944  0.0764  0.0808    0.1479  0.1400  0.1401  
F test (2) 11.08 *** 9.44 *** 7.88 ***   24.61 *** 13.40 *** 13.32 *** 
(1) GLS estimation of equation (5); below the estimates the standard errors are reported; ***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% 
rejection of the null hypothesis. (2) Under the null, all the explanatory variables have parameters equal to zero.  
 
 
 35 
Figure 1 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN UNCERTAINTY EFFECT ON PLANS 
AND THE % SHARE OF THE FIRST OWNER  
(a) linear relationship: itit,2 522v0934.00704.0ˆ ×−−=α  
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(b) logarithmic relationship: )522vlog(0295.014.0ˆ itit,2 ×−−=α  
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 (c) inverse relationship: itit,2 522v/0068.01337.0ˆ +−=α  
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Note. it,ˆ 2α  is reported along the vertical axes, v522 (= largest shareholder) along the 
horizontal ones. The lines are traced on the basis of 2αˆ  estimates in columns (3) and (4) 
of Table 7. 
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Appendix A1: Data sources and definitions 
A1.1 – Effective and planned investments 
From the SIM source, both effective and planned investments at current prices are available, 
disaggregated in three types of goods: structures, machinery and equipment; vehicles; non-residential 
buildings. For the ith company (i = 1, 2, …, N, N = 4860) at year t (t = 1, 2, ..., T, T = 9, from 1996 to 
2007), we indicate with jitINV  and 
j
1itt INV +  the level of effective investment realised in t, and of the 
investment planned in t for t+1, respectively; the superscript j (= m or f) indicates the type of good. In 
this paper we choose to analyse the behaviour of investment in structures, machinery, equipment and 
vehicles (j = m), compared with that of buildings (j = f).21
The corresponding data at constant (1995) prices are obtained in the following way.  
  
j
itINV  are deflated using the corresponding NA sectoral investment prices 
j
stPI  for all the companies 
belonging to sth industry: j
st
j
itj
it PI
INVI = .22
The investment price for t+1 as perceived in t and used to deflate 
  
j
1itt INV +  is defined as: 
j
st
j
1itt
j
1itt PI)(PI ++ += π1 , where 
j
1itt +π  is the expected inflation of the j-type investment price 
(estimated from the SIM source)23 jstPI, and  are the sectoral NA data defined above. Therefore, we 
obtain constant-prices planned investment as j
1itt
j
1ittj
1itt PI
INVI
+
+
+ = .  
A1.2 – Stock of capital 
The data on capital stocks, at constant prices, are constructed on the basis of the perpetual inventory 
method by using CADS nominal book values as “accounting” initial capital stocks and effective 
investments described in previous section; for details see Bontempi et al. (2009) 
A1.3 – Dummy and other control variables 
Time. Time dummies classify observations along time: τt = 1 if the observation refers to time t, zero 
otherwise. Therefore, τt dummies can be estimated in panel models but not in cross-sections, and their 
presence allows for a degree of dependency across companies in the panel due to collectively 
significant effects. 
Extraordinary operations. Three dummy variables equal to 1 if the company has been subject in t to: de-
merger, business combination, and merger. 
Zeros in the model’s explanatory variables. Two dummy variables, equal to 1 when expected demand and 
effective lagged investment are respectively zero. Note that zeros in the min-max range of growth in 
                                                 
21  SIM database reports, for each year in the sample, both preliminary and final investment figures. Given that the 
paper focuses on the explanation of planned investments for t+1, we prefer to use preliminary data because they are the 
only investment figures available in t, i.e. at the time new investments are planned. From statistical analyses, it turns out 
that preliminary and final data coincide for the large majority of cases (85 per cent for m goods and 91for f goods).  
22  Manufacturing activity is disaggregated into 13 sectors. 
23  From SIM, only the total-investment expected inflation, 
1itt +π , is available. Data for 
j
1itt +π  are estimated by 
exploiting the sectoral NA inflation differential of j-type investment with respect to the total m+ f, i.e.: 
)( 1st
j
1st1itt
j
1itt ++++ −+= ππππ , where j
st
j
st
j
1stj
1st PI
PIPI −
= ++π  is the j-type investment price inflation rate, and the total 
investment price inflation is defined as 
st
st1st
1st PI
PIPI −
= ++π  . 
 37 
expected demand are not marked with a dummy (as we did for demand and investment), because we 
interpret such result as “absence of uncertainty”.  
Credit rationing indicator. It is equal to 1 if the firm is credit-constrained. It is constructed using the 
answers to three questions on access to credit provided by the firms in the SIM sample. Specifically, 
firms are asked whether (i) at the current market interest rate they wish a larger amount of credit; (ii) 
they would be willing accept a small increase in the interest rate charged in order to obtain more 
credit; (iii) they have applied for credit but have been turned down. A company is classified as credit-
constrained if, given a positive answer to either question (i) or (ii), it also answered “yes” to question 
(iii). 
Reversibility indicator. The reversibility of the installed capital goods may be represented by an indicator 
based on transactions in the secondary market and on leased investment (reverst). It is a dummy 
variable equal to one if in t the ith firm purchased or sold investment goods in the second-hand market 
or leased them, zero otherwise. Leased investment is considered reversible because normally, as part 
of the leasing contract, the client acquires the option to return the good. As a consequence, leasing 
companies only finance the purchase of goods that enjoy large second-hand markets. Given that the 
question about leased investment has been dropped since the 2003 survey, we constructed a second 
reversibility indicator (REV) at company level by collapsing annual reverst data by firm. REV is equal 
to one if collapsed reverst is bigger than 1, i.e. if the firm operated for at least two years either on the 
second-hand or the leasing markets during the sample period. Alternatively, we imputed missing reverst 
data on the basis of a probit model whose regressors are the usual dummy variables, see e.g. 
Bontempi et al. (2007, Section 3).  
Cash flow, net of dividends paid. It is a no-dummy control variable. Individual data at current prices are 
from CADS database: CDit = cash flow (item 9.14) minus dividends (item 7.6). In order to obtain data 
at constant prices, CDit has been deflated using stPY  (the by-industry production deflator from NA, 
see e.g. Bond and Meghir, 1994): 
st
it
it PY
CDCF = . In analogy with explanatory effective investment in t-1, 
in our model the cash flow regressor has been scaled by lagged stock of capital. 
Table A1.1 
COMPOSITION OF SAMPLE BY SIZE, INDUSTRY AND LOCATION 
 Population 1 Our sample 2 
 >20 >50  
Manufacturing sectors:    
Textiles, clothing, leather, footwear 19.07 16.91 17.49 
Chemicals, rubber and plastics 9.40 11.90 10.81 
Metals, mech./elect. eng., motors, vehicles 43.74 45.24 48.38 
Food, timber, furniture, paper and other 27.79 25.95 23.32 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Geographical location:    
North-West 37.65 42.72 38.37 
North-East 31.69 31.53 15.17 
Centre 16.78 14.80 26.76 
South and Islands 13.88 10.95 19.70 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
(1) Italian firms with a size of more than 20 and more than 50 employees in 2002 (source ISTAT, 2005). (2) 
12002 firm-year observations of our basic sample. 
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Table A1.2 
THE POTENTIAL DETERMINANTS OF THE SHARE OF FAMILY FIRMS 
name definition data by weights to compute F1 
   regional provincial 
capsoc  social capital index province 0.163 0.166 
turnout election turnout province 0.157 0.160 
blood blood donation province 0.134 0.127 
trust2 trust from World Value Survey, wave # 2 region 0.090 0.111 
trust4 trust from World Value Survey, wave # 4 region 0.125 0.136 
duration length of ordinary civil proceedings province -0.139 -0.123 
cost administrative burdens on entry region -0.118 -0.134 
time time to obtain the permit to entry region -0.136 -0.133 
gdp percapita GDP in 2006  region 0.165 0.163 
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Appendix A2: Econometric issues 
The econometric issue to be tackled is that of endogeneity coming from two potential sources: (a) 
panel-dynamics and (b) endogenous or predetermined other explanatory variables.  
As far as dynamic is concerned, GMM estimators are typically used to obtain consistent parameter 
estimates in the context of dynamic single equations with panel data. However, GMM may be subject 
to large finite-sample biases when available instruments are weak (see e.g. Bond, 2002); this problem 
specifically occurs when data are highly persistent. Investigating the time series properties of the 
individual series of interest is therefore recommended. For this, Table A2.1 reports alternative estimates 
of the simple AR(1) specification for the main series in our model.24
 
 
Table A2.1 
ALTERNATIVE AR(1) PARAMETER ESTIMATES 
FOR THE MAIN VARIABLES OF INTEREST 1 
Estimators (2): OLS FE FD GMMd GMMs 
Variables:      
investment plans 0.4969 0.3277 -0.3196 0.3659 0.4686 
 0.0825 0.1337 0.0574 0.1042 0.0915 
AC1 (3) 0.387  0.470 0.006 0.003 
AC2 (3) 0.158  0.745 0.287 0.228 
Hansen (4)    0.101 0.158 
realized investments  0.1898 -0.0272 -0.3981 -0.0149 0.1257 
 0.0271 0.0289 0.0360 0.0527 0.0668 
AC1 (3) 0.367  0.594 0.002 0.000 
AC2 (3) 0.144  0.003 0.434 0.291 
Hansen (4)    0.380 0.185 
      
expected sales 0.9050 0.6352 0.0971 0.3959 0.4292 
 0.0168 0.0459 0.0656 0.1027 0.0884 
AC1 (3) 0.080  0.946 0.011 0.002 
AC2 (3) 0.965  0.439 0.319 0.316 
Hansen (4)    0.596 0.502 
      
uncertainty of future 
demand 0.5887 0.3285 0.0182 0.2793 0.4253 
 0.0984 0.0281 0.1760 0.0935 0.0754 
AC1 (3) 0.452  0.449 0.360 0.176 
AC2 (3) 0.585  0.294 0.283 0.272 
Hansen (4)    0.058 0.099 
(1) Below the estimates (in bold), the corresponding heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. (2) 
OLS = pooled OLS; FE = OLS within; FD = first differenced OLS; GMMd = first differenced GMM, 
see Arellano-Bond (1991); GMMs = GMM system, see Blundell-Bond (1998). (3) ACk = p-values of 
the residual kth order autocorrelation tests, see Arellano-Bond (1991). (4) P-values of the 
overidentifying restriction J-test, see Hansen (1982). 
 
                                                 
24  All the estimates in this paper are performed using the Stata xtabond2 procedure, see Roodman (2009).  
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Since all the four series are found to be not very persistent, difference GMM cannot be considered a 
priori affected by relevant downwards biases.  
On the other side, extra moment conditions of system GMM can further lead the estimates to be 
biased towards OLS because of the overfitting problem and lack of identification; see e.g. Ziliak (1997). 
In this context, the comparison of the consistent GMM estimators to simpler estimators like OLS 
levels and within/first-differenced OLS, which are likely to supply biased in opposite directions the 
parameter of the lagged dependent variable in short T panels, can help in detecting these biases. For 
this, Table A2.2 reports alternative estimates of the general model (3) using the data for the panel of 
family firms used in the main text. Results using other samples are available upon request. 
Table A2.2 
ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATES FOR THE GENERAL MODEL PARAMETERS (1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
estimators (2): OLS FE FD GMMd GMMd3 GMMds GMMs GMMs3 
α1 0.0028 0.0032 0.0227 0.0171 0.0164 0.0133 0.0047 0.0044 
 0.0013 0.0013 0.0067 0.0051 0.0049 0.0047 0.0026 0.0022 
α2 -0.0616 -0.0633 -0.0341 -0.0488 -0.0487 -0.0538 -0.0889 -0.0870 
 0.0639 0.0547 0.0165 0.0188 0.0190 0.0228 0.0421 0.0363 
α3 -0.1004 -0.1058 -0.0425 -0.3046 -0.3165 -0.3180 -0.3264 -0.3042 
 0.0762 0.0801 0.0601 0.1651 0.1699 0.1551 0.1452 0.1523 
β1 0.5291 0.5048 -0.2624 0.4266 0.4323 0.4357 0.4967 0.5009 
 0.1016 0.1089 0.0372 0.1147 0.1142 0.1010 0.0968 0.0970 
β2  
(3) 0.0015 0.0019 -0.0105 -0.0002 0.0004 -0.0013 0.0087 0.0053 
 0.0027 0.0030 0.0168 0.0160 0.0158 0.0227 0.0088 0.0065 
β3 -0.0173 -0.0192 0.0030 -0.0901 -0.1047 -0.1047 -0.1309 -0.0817 
 0.0349 0.0346 0.0462 0.1045 0.1048 0.1053 0.1080 0.1129 
β4 0.0329 0.0330 0.0328 0.0368 0.0371 0.0355 0.0425 0.0428 
 0.0128 0.0128 0.0188 0.0249 0.0249 0.0254 0.0232 0.0218 
N 835 835 613 613 613 835 835 835 
Tbar 3.9 3.9 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.9 3.9 3.9 
N×T 3336 3336 2228 2228 2228 3336 3336 3336 
AC: (4)         
- 1st order 0.374  0.021 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
- 2nd order 0.168  0.954 0.273 0.269 0.285 0.257 0.228 
Hansen (5)    0.626 0.611 0.632 0.357 0.299 
Diff-test (6)      0.234 0.003 0.015 
(1) Equation (3) estimates using the sample of the family-firms. Below the alternative estimates (in bold) there 
are the heteroschedasticity-consistent standard errors. (2) OLS = pooled OLS; FE = OLS within; FD = first 
differenced OLS; GMMd = first differenced GMM (lags from t-2); GMMd3 = first differenced GMM (lags from t-
3); GMMds = first differenced GMM and also GMM-levels for sales only (lags from t-2); GMMs = GMM system 
(lags from t-2); GMMs3 = GMM system (lags from t-3). (3) Being the explanatory measured in millions, 
estimates must be divided by 106. (4) AC = p-values of the residual autocorrelation tests, see Arellano and 
Bond (1991). (5) P-values of the overidentifying restriction J-test, see Hansen (1982). (6) Test for the extra 
moment conditions exploiting levels. 
 
Results are quite clear-cut. The estimates in the first three columns are biased by the omission of 
significant individual effects (OLS) and the endogeneity of at least the lagged dependent variable. In 
this context, as discussed in Bond (2002), the β1 OLS estimate is upwards biased while the FD one is 
underestimated. In the columns (4)-(6) the first differenced GMM estimates do not reject neither the 
second order autocorrelation nor the overidentification hypotheses, in addition the estimate of the 
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lagged dependent variable parameter always falls inside the OLS/FD range of opposite-sign bias. In the 
last two columns, the GMM system estimates reject the overidentification test for the incremental 
moment conditions in levels and, in general, show estimates qualitatively similar to those of (biased) 
OLS probably because overfitting. 
Despite we consider the difference GMM estimates more reliable than the others, it is worth noting the 
robustness of the finding about the significantly negative effect of uncertainty on investment plans. 
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